Ex post implementation in environments with private goods by Bikhchandani, Sushil
Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 369–393 1555-7561/20060369
Ex post implementation in environments with private goods
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Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles
We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in
a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent val-
ues. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-
dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for environments with
private goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) are com-
patible with ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals.




In models of mechanism design with interdependent values, each player’s information
is usually one dimensional. While this is convenient, it might not capture a signiﬁcant
element of the setting. For instance, suppose that agent A’s reservation value for an ob-
ject is the sum of a private value, which is idiosyncratic to this agent, and a common
value, which is the same for all agents in the model. Agent A’s private information con-
sists of an estimate of the common value and a separate estimate of his private value.
As other agents care only about A’s estimate of the common value, a one-dimensional
statistic does not capture all of A’s private information that is relevant to every agent
(including A).1
Therefore,itisimportanttotestwhetherinsightsfromtheliteraturearerobusttore-
laxing the assumption that an agent’s private information is one dimensional. Building
on earlier work by Maskin (1992), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show that if agents have
multi-dimensional information, interdependent values, and independent signals then,
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ordered so that a higher realization is more favorable, or that the valuation is a continuous function of the
signal.
Copyright c  2006 Sushil Bikhchandani. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial License 2.5. Available athttp://econtheory.org.370 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
unlike in models with one-dimensional information, every Bayesian Nash equilibrium
is (generically) inefﬁcient.2 Jehiel et al. (2006) call into question the existence of ex post
equilibrium when agents have multi-dimensional information and interdependent val-
ues. They show that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms do not generically exist
(except, of course, trivial mechanisms that disregard the reports of players).3
We prove an existence result for non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mecha-
nisms in a private goods setting when buyers have interdependent values and multi-
dimensional signals. To reconcile this with Jehiel et al.’s result, we note that their non-
existence result depends on the assumption that for any pair of outcomes there exist
at least two agents who are not indifferent between that pair of outcomes. In a private
goods environment, as agents care only about their own allocation, this assumption is
not satisﬁed. To see this, consider the sale of one indivisible object to two buyers, 1
and 2. There are three possible outcomes: ai, the good is assigned to buyer i, i = 1, 2,
and a0, neither gets the good. Buyer 1 is indifferent between a2 and a0 and buyer 2 is
indifferent between a1 and a0. There exist pairs of outcomes (namely (a0,a1) and also
(a0,a2)) between which all agents except one is indifferent. Consequently, preferences
over private goods are non-generic in the space of social choice settings considered by
Jehiel et al.; their deﬁnition of genericity requires the presence of externalities. There-
fore, even if buyers have multi-dimensional signals, the possibility of existence of non-
trivialexpostincentivecompatiblesellingmechanismsingenericprivategoodsmodels
is not precluded.
We prove an existence result for ex post incentive compatible mechanisms for the
sale of an indivisible (private) good to n buyers with multi-dimensional signals and
interdependent values. The assumptions of the model are not non-generic in private
goods environments. In the constructed mechanism, the rule for deciding whether
buyer 1, say, should be assigned the object is as follows. (The mechanism is illustrated
in Figure 1 for the case of n =2 buyers.) Fix the other buyers’ signals at some realization.
Partitionbuyer1’ssetofpossiblesignalrealizationsintoequivalenceclassesor“indiffer-
ence curves” such that buyer 1’s reservation value is constant on an indifference curve.
These indifference curves are completely ordered by buyer 1’s value. If a generalization
of the single-crossing property is satisﬁed then there exists a pivotal indifference curve
for buyer 1 with the property that it is ex post incentive compatible to award the object
to buyer 1 if and only if buyer 1’s signal realization is on an indifference curve that is
greater than the pivotal one. On the pivotal indifference curve, as illustrated in Figure 1,
the maximum of the other buyers’ values is equal to buyer 1’s value. If buyer 1 wins, the
price paid by him is equal to his value on the pivotal indifference curve; if he loses he
pays nothing. This mechanism is non-trivial and can be extended to multiple objects
when buyer preferences over objects are subadditive.
2See also Harstad et al. (1996), who obtain sufﬁcient conditions under which an efﬁcient allocation is
attained by common auction forms. McLean and Postlewaite (2004) show that efﬁcient Bayesian imple-
mentation is possible when signals are correlated.
3In a recent working paper, Mezzetti and Parreiras (2005) obtain sufﬁcient conditions for existence of
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Buyer 1’s indifference curves V1(·,s2)
Buyer 2’s indifference curves V2(s2,·)





















FIGURE 1. Indifference curves in buyer 1 signal space, s1 =(s11,s12)
The mechanism shares the feature with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-
dimensional information models that the price paid by the winning buyer is equal to
this buyer’s value at the lowest possible signal (i.e., on the pivotal indifference curve)
at which this buyer would just win. Thus, ex post equilibria in auction models with
one-dimensionalsignalsarerobustinthatnon-trivialexpostequilibriaexistevenwhen
buyers have multi-dimensional signals.
In a multi-dimensional signal setting the pivotal indifference curve for a buyer con-
sists of a continuum of this buyer’s signal realizations whereas in a one-dimensional
setting there is exactly one pivotal signal realization for this buyer. Consequently, when
thehighest twobuyer valuesareclose toeachother nobuyer’s signalisabove hispivotal
indifference curve. This ensures that the subset of buyers’ signals in which one buyer
gets the object does not share a common boundary with the (disjoint) subset of buyers’
signals in which another buyer gets the object.4 The social cost of incentive compatibil-
ity in our model is that the object is retained by the auctioneer and gains from trade are
not realized when the highest two buyer valuations are close to each other.
There are only private goods in our model. Thus, in environments with private
goods, informational externalities (i.e., interdependent values) alone do not preclude
the existence of ex post equilibrium in the presence of multi-dimensional signals. One
needs consumption externalities or public goods, in addition to information externali-
4It is precisely the existence of such a common boundary that is used by Jehiel et al. to show the non-
existence of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms in a setting in which auctions are non-generic.372 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
ties, for generic non-existence. Ex post equilibrium has been employed mostly in auc-
tionmodelswithprivategoods;5 hence,thesemodelsarerobusttorelaxingtheassump-
tion of one-dimensional signals.
The mechanism described above is conditionally efﬁcient in that whenever it allo-
catestheobject,itistothebuyerwiththehighestvaluation. Furthermore,itismoreefﬁ-
cientthananyotherconditionallyefﬁcientmechanism. However, thismechanismneed
not be efﬁcient, subject to incentive constraints, and a constrained efﬁcient mechanism
need not be conditionally efﬁcient. Contrast this to one-dimensional signal models,
where constrained, conditional, and ﬁrst-best efﬁciency are attained in the same mech-
anism because incentive constraints do not bind.
Thepaperisorganizedasfollows. AmodelwithtwobuyersispresentedinSection2,
together with preliminary results. An existence result for ex post incentive compatible
mechanisms in a model with two buyers and one private good is proved in Section 3.
Thisresultisgeneralizedton buyers,andpossibleextensionstomodelswithmanybuy-
ers and many objects are explored in Section A of the appendix. A sufﬁcient condition
and a necessary condition for constrained efﬁciency is provided in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The main idea can be seen in a model with two buyers, i = 1, 2, and one indivisible ob-
ject. The information state is denoted s. Each buyer i observes a d i ≥ 2 dimensional
private signal si = (si1,si2,...,sid i) about the information state. The domain of si is
Si = [0,1]d i. Without loss of generality, the buyers’ information jointly determines the
information state with s =(s1,s2).6 Buyer i’s reservation value for the object in informa-
tion state s =(si,sj) is Vi(si,sj). Buyers have quasilinear utility. If buyer i gets the object
in state s and pays t, then his utility is Vi(s)−t; if he does not get the object and pays t,
his utility is −t.
The outcome in which buyer i, i =1, 2, is allocated the object is denoted ai, and the
outcome in which no buyer gets the object is a0. A (deterministic) mechanism consists
of an allocation rule h and payment functions ˆ ti, i = 1, 2. The allocation rule h : S →
{a0,a1,a2} is a function from the buyers’ reported signals to an outcome; the payment
function ˆ ti : S → R∪{∞} is a function from the buyers’ reported signals to a monetary
payment by buyer i.
A mechanism (h,ˆ t) is ex post incentive compatible if for i, j =1, 2, i 6= j,
Vi(si,sj)1{h(si,sj)=ai} − ˆ ti(si,sj)≥Vi(si,sj)1{h(s0
i,sj)=ai} − ˆ ti(s0
i,sj) ∀si, ∀s0
i, ∀sj, (1)
where 1A is the indicator function of the event A. In other words, at each information
state if buyer j truthfully reports his signal then buyer i can do no better than truth-
5See, for example, Crémer and McLean (1985), Ausubel (1999), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Perry and
Reny (2002), and Bergemann and Välimäki (2002).
6An information state will also be denoted as s =(si,sj), where i,j ∈{1,2}, i 6= j.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Ex post implementation 373
fully report his signal.7 If a mechanism (h,ˆ t) satisﬁes (1) then the allocation rule h is
implementable and ˆ t is said to implement h.
Clearly, ex post incentive compatibility implies that ˆ ti(si,sj) = ˆ ti(s0
i,sj) if h(si,sj) =
h(s0
i,sj); otherwise, if say ˆ ti(si,sj) < ˆ ti(s0
i,sj) then buyer i has an incentive to misreport
si at information state (s0
i,sj). In effect, the payment function ˆ ti maps {a0,a1,a2}×Sj
to R∪{∞}. The following characterization of ex post implementability is due to Chung
and Ely (2003).
LEMMA 1 (Chung and Ely 2003). An allocation rule h is implementable if and only if for
each i, ak, and sj, j 6=i, there exist transfers ˆ ti(ak,sj)∈R∪{∞} such that
h(s)∈argmax
ak
{Vi(si,sj)1{h(si,sj)=ai} − ˆ ti(ak,sj)}.
Without loss of generality we assume that ˆ ti(a0,sj) = ˆ ti(a j,sj) for all sj.8 Thus,
buyer i’s monetary payment depends only on whether or not buyer i is assigned the
object and on buyer j’s reported signal, j 6= i. We restrict attention to mechanisms in
which a buyer pays nothing if he does not get the object; that is, ˆ ti(ak,sj)=0 if ak 6=ai.
From Lemma 1 it is clear that this does not decrease the set of implementable allocation
rules. With this restriction on monetary payments we may write
ˆ ti(ak,sj)≡
(
ti(sj) if ak =ai
0 otherwise.
If h(si,sj)6=ai for all si then let ti(sj)=∞.
For mechanisms in which losing buyers pay nothing, the requirement of ex post in-












of ti(sj) as a personalized price at which the object is available to buyer i at information
states (·,sj). Let t =(t1,t2).
Thus, any implementable allocation rule may be implemented with personalized
prices. One may also ask what type of personalized prices implement some allocation
rule. To this end, deﬁne a pair of personalized price functions ti(sj), tj(si) to be ad-
missible if in each information state at most one buyer’s value exceeds his personalized
price:
Vi(si,sj)>ti(sj)=⇒Vj(sj,si)≤tj(si) ∀si,sj.
7Ex post incentive compatibility is the same as uniform equilibrium of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet
(1979) and uniform incentive compatibility of Holmström and Myerson (1983).
8If, say, ˆ ti(a0,sj) < ˆ ti(a j,sj) for some sj, then from Lemma 1 we see that h(si,sj) 6= a j for any si. There-
fore, letting ˆ t 0
i(a j,sj) ≡ ˆ ti(a0,sj), the transfers ˆ ti(a0,sj), ˆ t 0
i(a j,sj), ˆ ti(ai,sj) satisfy the argmax condition of
Lemma 1 at sj.374 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)









As t is admissible, h is a well-deﬁned allocation rule. Using (2) it is easily veriﬁed that
(h,t) is ex post incentive compatible.
A mechanism (h,t) is non-trivial if there exist at least two distinct outcomes, each
of which is in the range of h at a positive (Lebesgue) measure of information states.
Any pair of personalized prices implements an ex post implementable allocation rule.
However, the mechanism may be trivial. Existence of a non-trivial ex post incentive
compatible mechanism is proved in the next section.
3. EXISTENCE
Weprovethatunderreasonableassumptions,anon-trivialexpostincentivecompatible
mechanism exists in the model described in the previous section. An extension of this
result to n buyers is straightforward and sketched out in Section A of the appendix. The
possibility of non-trivial mechanisms when many objects are to be allocated is explored
in Section B of the appendix.
We assume that higher signals correspond to better news. That is, players’ reserva-
tion values do not decrease as buyer signals increase.9 In order to simplify the proofs,
we assume also that buyers’ reservation values are continuous.
ASSUMPTION 1. For i =1, 2, Vi is (a) non-decreasing and (b) continuous.
The assumption that Vi is non-decreasing in sj can be dropped provided one as-
sumes that Vi is increasing in si. The next assumption is a generalization of the single-
crossing property.10





As buyer i’s signal increases from si to s0
i, the increase in i’s value is not less than the
increase in buyer j’s value. That is, buyer i’s value is at least as responsive as buyer j’s
value to changes in buyer i’s signal. In models with one-dimensional signals, Assump-
tion 2 is a version of the single-crossing property that is a sufﬁcient condition for exis-
tence of an efﬁcient mechanism in such models (see Maskin 1992).
The next assumption rules out the uninteresting case where the efﬁcient rule is triv-
ial. As any trivial rule is ex post incentive compatible, if Assumption 3 is violated then
the efﬁcient rule is ex post incentive compatible.
9The following terminology regarding monotonicity of a function f : Rn → R is adopted. For x, x0 ∈ Rn,
x0 >x denotes thatx0 is at least as large asx in every co-ordinate andx0 6=x. If f (x0)≥ f (x) wheneverx0 >x
then f is non-decreasing. If f (x0)> f (x) whenever x0 >x then f is increasing.
10An equivalent assumption is that for each sj, Vi(si,sj)−Vj(sj,si) is a non-decreasing function of si.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Ex post implementation 375
ASSUMPTION 3. For each buyer, there exists a positive measure of information states at
which this buyer’s valuation is strictly greater than the other buyer’s valuation.
We construct an admissible pair of personalized prices under Assumptions 1 and 2.
If, in addition, Assumption 3 holds then the allocation rule implemented by this pair of
admissible prices is non-trivial.
Fix buyer j’s signal at some level sj. The domain of si, i 6= j, is the unit cube in
Rd i
+ and each buyer’s valuation is non-decreasing in si. Therefore, with buyer j’s signal
ﬁxed at sj, the maximum of either buyer’s reservation value as a function of buyer i’s
signal is attained when si = 1, where 1 denotes the point (1,1,...,1) in Rd i
+ . Similarly,
the minimum of either buyer’s value as a function of si is attained at si =0≡(0,0,...,0).
Deﬁne Si(λ,sj), the set of signals of buyer i that lead to the same reservation value for
buyer i as the signal ˆ si =λ1, where λ∈[0,1]. That is,
Si(λ,sj)≡{si ∈Si |Vi(si,sj)=Vi(λ1,sj)} 0≤λ≤1.
Thus, for a ﬁxed sj, buyer i’s signal space is partitioned into equivalence classes or “in-
difference” curves,Si(λ,sj), one for each λ ∈ [0,1], with Vi(λ01,sj) ≥ Vi(λ1,sj) whenever
λ0 >λ.
While buyer i’s value (as a function of si) is constant on his indifference curve
Si(λ,sj), buyer j’s value is, in general, not constant on this set. The maximum of











ij (λ,sj) = Vj(sj,sm
ij (λ,sj)) and Vi(sm
ij (λ,sj),sj) = Vi(λ1,sj). As Si is compact and
Vi(·,sj) is continuous, Si(λ,sj) is compact. This, together with the continuity of Vj(sj,·)
implies that V m
ij (λ,sj) exists. The continuity of the valuations (Assumption 1b) implies
that V m
ij (λ,sj) is continuous in λ and sj. As Vj is non-decreasing in si (Assumption 1a),
V m
ij (λ,sj) is non-decreasing in λ.
Figure 1 depicts indifference curves of buyers 1 and 2 in buyer 1’s (two-dimensional)
signal space, keeping buyer 2’s signal ﬁxed at some value s2. By Assumption 1a, indif-
ference curves are negatively sloped. However, (i) the indifference curves need not be
convex; (ii) indifference curves may touch the axes; and (iii) the maximum value for
buyer 2 in buyer 1’s indifference curve may be attained at more than one point. “Thick”
indifference curves are not ruled out, unless we strengthen Assumption 1a to require
that buyers’ valuations be (strictly) increasing in signals. At any other value of buyer 2’s
signal, s0
2 6= s2, buyer 1’s indifference curves in s1 space are different from, and may in-
tersect with, the ones depicted in Figure 1.11
11The two sets of buyer 1 indifference curves for two different values of buyer 2 signals do not intersect if
buyer 1’s valuation is separable in s1 and s2, i.e., V1(s1,s2)=u(s1)+v(s2).376 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Ex post incentive compatibility imposes the following necessary condition. If
buyer 1, say, is allocated the object at information state (s1,s2), then he should also be
allocated the object at any information state (s0
1,s2) such that V1(s0




1,s2). That is, an implementable allocation rule must be weakly monotone.12
We construct an ex post incentive compatible mechanism in which, for each value
of sj, there exists a λ∗
ij(sj) ∈ [0,1] such that buyer i wins if and only if his signal is in
an indifference curve (with an index) greater than λ∗
ij(sj). Clearly, this allocation rule
satisﬁes weak monotonicity. CallSi(λ∗
ij(sj),sj) the pivotal indifference curve for buyer i
at sj. Any si in the pivotal indifference curve is a pivotal signal for buyer i. Buyer i’s
personalized price is deﬁned to be V m
ij (λ∗
ij(sj),sj), the maximum of buyer j’s value in
buyer i’s pivotal indifference curve (and this is usually equal to buyer i’s value on the
pivotal indifference curve).13 These personalized prices are admissible if Vi(λ1,sj) −
V m
ij (λ,sj) is non-decreasing in λ. This is shown in the next lemma.




PROOF. To simplify notation, we write sm
ij (λ0), sm
ij (λ) for sm
ij (λ0,sj), sm
ij (λ,sj).
Let λm ∈ [0,1] be such that λmsm
ij (λ0) ∈ Si(λ,sj). To see that λm exists, deﬁne
f (x) ≡ Vi(xsm
ij (λ0),sj), where x ∈ [0,1], and note that f (1) = Vi(sm
ij (λ0),sj) = Vi(λ01,sj) ≥
Vi(λ1,sj) ≥ V(0,sj) = f (0). By Assumption 1b, f (x) is a continuous function of x, and
therefore there exists λm such that f (λm) = Vi(λmsm
ij (λ0),sj) = Vi(λ1,sj). (As shown in
Figure 2, λmsm
ij (λ0) is on the line joining sm













where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that λmsm
ij (λ0)∈Si(λ,sj) and (4), and the




12See Bikhchandani et al. (2006) for conditions under which weak monotonicity is also sufﬁcient for in-
centive compatibility.
13In Figure 1, V1(s1,s2) = VP is the pivotal indifference curve for buyer 1 when buyer 2’s signal is at s2.
On this indifference curve, the highest valuation of buyer 2 is also VP, which is buyer 1’s personalized price
at s2.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Ex post implementation 377
Buyer i’s “indifference curves”

















FIGURE 2. Proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 implies that gij(λ;sj) is a non-decreasing function of λ. The continuity of Vi
andofV m







max{λ∈[0,1]| gij(λ;sj)=0} if gij(1;sj)≥0≥ gij(0;sj)
0− if gij(0;sj)>0,
where 0− is a negative number arbitrarily close to 0. Hence, Vi(λ1,sj) > V m
ij (λ,sj) if and
only if λ > λ∗
ij.14 Deﬁne V m
ij (0−,sj) = V m
ij (0,sj). Then, as V m




ij,sj) if and only if Vi(λ1,sj)>V m







be buyer i’s personalized price as a function of sj.15 Theorem 1 shows that the following
allocationruleisnon-trivialandimplementable: buyeri winsifandonlyifhisvaluation
exceeds the personalized price deﬁned in (6).
14Hereafter, the dependence of λ∗
ij on sj is usually suppressed to simplify the notation.
15Note that if λ∗




ij,sj) and therefore t ∗
i (sj) = Vi(λ∗
ij1,sj). If λ∗




i (sj) and if λ∗
ij =1 then Vi(1,sj)≤V
m
ij (1,sj)=t ∗
i (sj).378 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
THEOREM 1. Thepersonalizedprices t ∗ =(t ∗
1,t ∗
2)deﬁnedin(6)areadmissible. Themech-
anism (h∗,t ∗), where h∗ is supported by t ∗, is non-trivial and ex post incentive compati-
ble.
PROOF. Suppose that the information state is (si,sj). Let λi be deﬁned by Vi(λi1,sj) =
Vi(si,sj). Note that (4) implies
V2(s2,s1)≤V m
12 (λ1,s2) and V1(s1,s2)≤V m
21 (λ2,s1). (7)
Suppose that V1(s1,s2) > t ∗
1(s2) = V m
12 (λ∗
12,s2). By (5), λ1 > λ∗
12 and V1(s1,s2) =
V1(λ11,s2) > V m
12 (λ1,s2). Hence, (7) implies that V m
21 (λ2,s1) > V2(s2,s1) = V2(λ21,s1).
From (5) we have λ∗
21 ≥ λ2 and, therefore, V2(s2,s1) = V2(λ21,s1) ≤ V m
21 (λ∗
21,s1) = t ∗
2(s1).
An identical argument implies that if, instead, V2(s2,s1) > t ∗
2(s1), then V1(s1,s2) ≤ t ∗
1(s2).





a1 if V1(s1,s2)>t ∗
1(s2)
a2 if V2(s2,s1)>t ∗
2(s1)
a0 otherwise.
Clearly, the mechanism (h∗,t ∗) is feasible and ex post incentive compatible.
To complete the proof, we show that (h∗,t ∗) is non-trivial. Let information state s1 =
(s1
1,s1














2), which implies λ∗
12(s1
2)<
1. Hence buyer 1 gets the object at (s1,s1
2) for all s1 ∈ S1(λ,s1
2), λ ∈ (λ∗
12(s1
2),1]. As there
is a positive measure of information states at which buyer 1’s value is strictly greater
than buyer 2’s value, there is a positive measure of information states at which buyer 1 is
allocated the object. A similar argument establishes that buyer 2 is allocated the object
at a positive measure of information states. Hence, the mechanism is non-trivial. 
Neither buyer is allocated the object when their valuations are close to each other.
This occurs at information states s =(si,sj) such that λi(s)<λ∗
ij(sj) and λj(s)<λ∗
ji(si).
Such information states have positive measure unless either (i) buyers’ indifference
curves in Si space for each ﬁxed sj, i = 1, 2, i 6= j are identical or (ii) Assumption 3
is not satisﬁed. From Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) we know that any incentive com-
patible mechanism, including this one, is (generically) inefﬁcient.16 The source of the
inefﬁciency in the current mechanism is the cost of enforcing incentives when buyer
valuations are close.
A mechanism is conditionally efﬁcient if, when the object is allocated, it is given to
the buyer with the highest valuation. Conditional efﬁciency is a desirable property for a
seller who wishes to prevent resale. The mechanism constructed in Theorem 1 is con-
ditionally efﬁcient. To see this, suppose that buyer i is allocated the object at informa-
tion state s = (si,sj). Let λi(si,sj) and λ∗
ij(sj) be deﬁned at this state in the usual man-
ner. Then, from the proof of Theorem 1 it is clear that λi(si,sj) > λ∗
ij(sj) and therefore
16Es˝ o and Maskin (2000) describe a multi-dimensional signal environment in which an efﬁcient mecha-
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Vi(si,sj)>V m
ij (λi(si,sj),sj)≥Vj(sj,si). Inthenextsectionweshowthatthismechanism
allocates the object at more information states, and is therefore more efﬁcient, than any
other conditionally efﬁcient mechanism.
Recall that any signal si in the pivotal indifference curveSi(λ∗
ij,sj) is a pivotal signal
for buyer i at sj. With buyer j’s signal ﬁxed at sj, buyer i wins (loses) at signals greater
(less) than a pivotal signal. Thus a pivotal signal is an inﬁmum of winning signals. The
price paid by a winning buyer i equals the valuation of this buyer at a pivotal signal
(provided that λ∗
ij ∈ [0,1)). This is similar to the generalizations of Vickrey auctions in
Ausubel(1999)andinDasguptaandMaskin(2000),wherebuyershaveone-dimensional
signals.17 However, unlike in these models, in the mechanism of Theorem 1 the valua-
tions of buyers i and j need not be equal at a pivotal signal of buyer i; at a pivotal signal
of buyer i, buyer i’s valuation equals the most that buyer j’s valuation can be in the
pivotal indifference curve of buyer i. The difference arises because in one-dimensional
models, indifference curves of buyer i signals are singletons and hence for a given re-
alization of sj there can be only one pivotal signal for buyer i. A second difference is
the role of the single-crossing property or Assumption 2. With one-dimensional signals,
the single-crossing property is sufﬁcient for the existence of an efﬁcient ex post incen-
tive compatible mechanism whereas with multi-dimensional signals Assumption 2 is
sufﬁcient for the existence of an ex post incentive compatible mechanism (which is in-
efﬁcient).
Next, we illustrate the construction in Theorem 1 with an example from Jehiel et al.
(2006).
EXAMPLE 1. Two buyers compete for an indivisible object. Each gets a pair of signals
(pi,ci), i = 1, 2. Buyer i’s valuation for the object is Vi(pi,ci,pj,cj) = pi +cicj, j 6= i.
Further, each buyer’s signal lies in the unit square: (pi,ci)∈[0,1]2, i =1, 2.
Fix buyer j’s signals at (pj,cj). Buyer i’s indifference curves in ci,pi space are
straight lines with slope −cj. (Buyer j’s indifference curves are vertical lines, as Vj
does not depend upon pi.) It may be veriﬁed that the pivotal indifference curve goes
through the point pi = ci = (pj +cj)/(1+cj) and Vi = V m
ij = pj +cj on this indifference
curve.
Therefore, using (6), deﬁne personalized prices t ∗
i (pj,cj) = pj +cj, t ∗
j (pi,ci) = pi +
ci. Theorem 1 implies (and it may be directly veriﬁed) that these prices are admissible.
Let h∗ be the allocation rule supported by the prices t ∗
1, t ∗
2. In the ex post incentive
compatible mechanism (h∗,t ∗), the buyers report their private signals. The mechanism
designer allocates the object to buyer i for a payment equal to his personalized price
t ∗
i (pj,cj) = pj +cj if and only if Vi(pi,ci,pj,cj) = pi +cicj exceeds t ∗
i (pj,cj). As noted
in the discussion after Theorem 1, this mechanism is efﬁcient conditional on the object
being allocated to a buyer. This is checked directly as Vi = pi +cicj > pj +cj ≥ pj +
cicj =Vj.
17There is one difference in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). The mechanism designer (auctioneer) does
not know the mapping from buyer signals to valuations. Hence, buyers submit contingent bids rather than








FIGURE 3. Domain of buyers’ signals,S
Let (h∗)−1(ak) be the set of information states that are mapped onto ak by this allo-
cation mechanism. We have
(h∗)−1(ai)={(pi,ci,pj,cj)∈[0,1]4 |pi −pj >cj −cicj}, i =1,2
(h∗)−1(a0)={(pi,ci,pj,cj)∈[0,1]4 |cicj −ci ≤pi −pj ≤cj −cicj}.
The boundary between the sets (h∗)−1(a1) and (h∗)−1(a2) is
(h∗)−1(a1)∩(h∗)−1(a2)={(p1,c1,p2,c2)∈[0,1]4 |p1 =p2, c1 =c2 =0},
where A is the closure of set A. The boundary between two subsets of the unit cube
in R4 can be three-dimensional; here, the boundary between between (h∗)−1(a1) and
(h∗)−1(a2) is one-dimensional. We refer to this as the boundary being of less than full
dimension, and return to this point below. ◊
Relationship with Jehiel et al. (2006)
Consider a setting where the object is always allocated, i.e., the outcome a0 is ruled
out. Deﬁne µ1(s) ≡ V1(s), µ2(s) ≡ −V2(s), the difference between the two buyers’ val-
uations for outcomes a1 and a2. The domain of signals, S, is shown schematically in
Figure 3a. Any non-trivial allocation rule h partitionsS into two subsets, depending on
whether h(s) = a1 or h(s) = a2. The boundary between these two sets is the broken
line in Figure 3a. Jehiel et al. show that for any non-trivial ex post incentive compati-
ble allocation rule this boundary is full dimensional and ex post incentive compatibility
implies that the gradients of µ1(s) and µ2(s) on the boundary must be, roughly speak-
ing, co-directional. They show that this condition is impossible to satisfy for generic
reservation values and hence the generic non-existence of ex post incentive compatible
mechanisms.
The Jehiel et al. proof depends on the assumption that each buyer is not indifferent
between the two outcomes a1 and a2. Suppose we add back the third outcome, a0. For
their argument to extend it must be case that each buyer is not indifferent between any
two of the three outcomes. This assumption does not hold in the private goods model
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state. Now consider a non-trivial ex post incentive compatible allocation rule h that
yields each of the three outcomes a0, a1, and a2. Jehiel et al.’s theorem implies that
the boundary between h−1(a1) and h−1(a2) has less than full dimension. Their theorem
does not impose any restriction on the dimensionality of the boundary between a0 and
ai, i = 1, 2. In particular, the possibility that h partitions S as shown in Figure 3b is
not ruled out. In fact, this ﬁgure is a schematic representation of Example 1 where we
demonstrated existence of an ex post incentive compatible mechanism in which the
boundary between h−1(a1) and h−1(a2) is of less than full dimension.
More generally, suppose there are i = 1,2,...,n buyers and L outcomes labeled a`,
` = 1,2,...,L. Suppose that there exist two outcomes a` and ak such that all buyers
except one are indifferent between these two outcomes at every information state:
a`(s)∼i ak(s) ∀s,∀i 6= j. (8)
The Jehiel et al. theorem does not rule out generic existence of a non-trivial ex post in-
centive compatible mechanism with outcomes a` and ak.
Consider the allocation of a bundle of private goods to n buyers. Each outcome is
an assignment of objects among the n buyers, where we allow the possibility that not
all objects are allocated to the buyers. Let a` be any assignment and let ak be another
assignment that differs from a` only in the allocation that buyer j receives.18 Condi-
tion (8) is satisﬁed for each assignment a`. A full range ex post incentive compatible
mechanism is a possibility.19
Thus, in order to obtain their non-existence result, the notion of genericity that
Jehiel et al. consider necessarily includes perturbations that add externalities to the
model. Theorem 1 is true for a class of models, namely those satisfying Assumptions
1 to 3, that is not non-generic in the space of quasilinear models without allocative ex-
ternalities.
Theorem 1 is easily extended to allow for n buyers (see Section A of the appendix).
Non-trivial ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist also when there are several
objects for sale and buyers have subadditive preferences (see Section B).
4. CONSTRAINED EFFICIENCY
We obtain a necessary condition and a sufﬁcient condition for second-best efﬁcient
mechanisms within the class of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. Throughout
this section, strengthened versions of Assumptions 1 and 2 (of Section 3) are assumed,
with strict inequality replacing weak inequality. Thus, Vi is continuous, increasing, and
strict single-crossing holds.
A mechanism dominates another mechanism if at each information state the sum
of reservation values attained under the ﬁrst mechanism is weakly greater than the sum
of reservation values attained under the second mechanism, with strict improvement at
18Thus, not all the objects are allocated in at least one of the two assignments a`, ak.
19A mechanism has full range if each outcome is implemented at a positive measure of information
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somestate. Anexpostincentivecompatiblemechanismis(expost)constrainedefﬁcient
ifitisundominatedbyanotherexpostincentivecompatiblemechanism. Thedeﬁnition
of constrained efﬁciency is due to Holmström and Myerson (1983).
In Section 2 we saw that any implementable allocation rule can be implemented
through admissible prices.20 The allocation rules supported by a pair of admissible
prices differ along pivotal indifference curves. We modify (3), the deﬁnition of an al-
location rule supported by admissible prices, so as to allocate the object to buyers on
pivotal indifference curves whenever possible. Deﬁne
h(s1,s2)≡

    
    
a1 if V1(s1,s2)>t1(s2)
a1 if V1(s1,s2)=t1(s2) and V2(s2,s1)≤t2(s1)
a2 if V2(s2,s1)>t2(s1)
a2 if V2(s2,s1)=t2(s1) and V1(s1,s2)<t1(s2)
a0 otherwise.
(9)
This allocation rule h is supported by admissible prices t, i.e., (h,t) is ex post incentive
compatible; moreover, it dominates the allocation rule deﬁned in (3) and is undomi-
nated by any other allocation rule supported by t.
Let (ti,tj) be admissible prices. Fix buyer j’s signal at sj. At any buyer i pivotal
signal si, we have Vi(si,sj) = ti(sj). Admissibility, together with continuity of valuations
in signals, implies that for any si that is pivotal at sj, we have Vj(sj,si) ≤ tj(si), i.e., sj is
(weakly) less than pivotal. With this background, consider the following deﬁnitions.
A pair of signals (si,sj) is mutually pivotal under admissible prices (ti,tj) if si is piv-
otal for buyer i at sj and sj is pivotal for buyer j at si. If at every sj, j = 1, 2, for which
there is a buyer i pivotal signal, there exist mutually pivotal signals (si,sj), then admis-
sible prices (ti,tj) are mutually pivotal. This is a necessary condition for constrained
efﬁciency.
THEOREM 2. Let (h,t)beanexpostincentivecompatiblemechanisminwhichtheadmis-
sible prices are continuous functions. If (h,t) is constrained efﬁcient then the admissible
prices must be mutually pivotal.
PROOF. Supposethatcontinuousadmissibleprices(ti,tj)arenotmutuallypivotal. That
is, there exists sj such that
Vi(0,sj)≤ti(sj)≤Vi(1,sj) (10)
for any si, Vi(si,sj)=ti(sj)=⇒Vj(sj,si)<tj(si). (11)
Inequalities (10) imply that there exists at least one buyer i pivotal signal at sj, and (11)
states that sj is not buyer j pivotal at any of these buyer i pivotal signals. Deﬁne t 0
j ≡tj,
and t 0
i to be identical to ti except at sj where t 0
i(sj) = ti(sj)−ε. The continuity of Vi,Vj,
20For this reason, we sometimes write that admissible prices t dominate admissible prices t 0 or that
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andtj impliesthatifε>0issmallthent 0 isadmissible. (Ofcourse t 0 isnotcontinuous.)
When buyer j’s signal is not sj, (the allocation rules implemented by) t 0 and t lead to
identical outcomes. However, at sj the subset of buyer i signals at which buyer i gets
the object is strictly larger under t 0 than under t whereas the subset of buyer i signals at
which buyer j gets the object is identical under t and t 0. Thus, t is dominated by t 0. 
Consider the following deﬁnition. Admissible personalized prices (ti,tj) are strongly
mutually pivotal if for each sj
(i) if Vi(0,sj)≤ti(sj)≤Vi(1,sj) then there exists si such that
ti(sj)=Vi(si,sj)=Vj(sj,si)=tj(si)
(ii) if, instead, Vi(0,sj)>ti(sj) then Vi(0,sj)≥Vj(sj,0)
(iii) if, instead, Vi(1,sj)<ti(sj) then Vi(1,sj)≤Vj(sj,1), and ∀si, Vj(sj,si)>tj(si).
Condition (i) strengthens the requirement of mutually pivotal prices to require that
there exist mutually pivotal signals at which the two buyers’ valuations are the same.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) impose restrictions when there do not exist buyer i pivotal sig-
nals and either buyer i always wins or buyer i always loses at sj. As valuations are con-
tinuous,stronglymutuallypivotalpricesarecontinuousfortherangeofsignalsinwhich
(i) holds.
For one-dimensional signals, a generalized Vickrey auction is ﬁrst-best efﬁcient
(provided single crossing holds); it is also strongly mutually pivotal. This condition is
sufﬁcient for constrained efﬁciency when signals are multi-dimensional.
THEOREM 3. An ex post incentive compatible mechanism (h,t) is constrained efﬁcient if
(t1,t2) are strongly mutually pivotal.
PROOF. Suppose that (ti,tj) are strongly mutually pivotal. Fix buyer j’s signal at sj and
supposethatapivotalsignalexistsforbuyeri (case(i)ofthedeﬁnitionofstronglymutu-
ally pivotal). Then there exists si such that ti(sj)=Vi(si,sj)=Vj(sj,si)=tj(si). Suppose
that si 6=0 or 1. For small enough δ, ˆ δ ∈R
di
+ , δ, ˆ δ 6=0, we have si −δ, si + ˆ δ ∈[0,1]di. The
strict single-crossing property implies that
Vi(si −δ,sj)<Vj(sj,si −δ)
Vi(si + ˆ δ,sj)>Vj(sj,si + ˆ δ).
Let (t 0
i,t 0
j) be another pair of admissible personalized prices. Suppose that t 0
i(sj)<ti(sj)
at sj. For small enough δ the object is allocated to buyer j under t and to buyer i under
t 0 at (si −δ,sj). The ﬁrst inequality above implies that t 0 does not dominate t. Suppose
instead that t 0
i(sj) > ti(sj). For small enough ˆ δ the object is allocated to buyer i under
t and to buyer j under t 0 at (si + ˆ δ,sj). The second inequality above implies that t 0
does not dominate t. The proof for si = 0 or 1 is similar, with only one of the above
inequalities being used in each case.384 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Next, suppose that there is no buyer i pivotal signal at sj. First, consider case (ii). By
single-crossing Vi(si,sj) ≥ Vj(sj,si) for all si. Under t buyer i gets the object at (si,sj)
for all si and hence the allocation cannot be improved. Suppose, instead, we are in case
(iii). By single-crossing, for all si the best use of the object at (si,sj) is to allocate it to
buyer j, which is the allocation under t. 
The notion of constrained efﬁciency is different from that of conditional efﬁciency.
There usually does not exist a mechanism that satisﬁes both. As already noted, the
mechanism constructed in Theorem 1 is conditionally efﬁcient. However, it need not
satisfy the mutually pivotal prices condition of Theorem 2 and therefore is, in general,
not constrained efﬁcient. (Recall that the admissible prices in this mechanism are con-
tinuous.) This is illustrated next, in a continuation of Example 1.
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the same setting and valuation functions as in Example 1 of the
previous section. The allocation rule supported by the personalized prices t ∗
i (pi,ci) =
pi +ci is the mechanism of Theorem 1. We directly veriﬁed that this mechanism is con-
ditionally efﬁcient. Theorem 4 below implies that it dominates any other conditionally
efﬁcient mechanism. However, as shown below, this mechanism is not constrained efﬁ-
cient.
Fix buyer 2’s signal at (p2,c2), c2 > 0. Buyer 1’s pivotal indifference curve is p1 =
p2 +c2 −c1c2. For any (p1,c1) on this indifference curve,
t ∗
2(p1,c1)=p1 +c1 =p2 +c2 −c1c2 +c1 >p2 +c1c2 =V2(p2,c2,p1,c1).
Thus, (11) implies that t ∗
1 and t ∗
2 are not mutually pivotal. As t ∗
1 and t ∗
2 are continuous,
Theorem 2 implies that this mechanism is not constrained efﬁcient.
A constrained efﬁcient mechanism Deﬁne personalized prices ti(pj,cj) ≡ pj +c2
j and
tj(pi,ci)≡pi +c2
i . Suppose that
Vi(pi,ci,pj,cj)=pi +cicj >pj +c2
j =ti(pj,cj).
Then pi −pj >c2
j −cicj ≥cicj −c2
i implies that
Vj(pj,cj,pi,ci)=pj +cicj <pi +c2
i =tj(pi,ci).
Consequently, personalized prices p2+c2
2 for buyer 1 and p1+c2
1 for buyer 2 are admis-
sible. Let h be the allocation rule supported by the prices t1,t2 (as deﬁned in (9)). The
mechanism (h,t) is ex post incentive compatible. From the fact ti(pj,cj) ≤ t ∗
i (pj,cj),
with strict inequality whenever cj <1, we conclude that (i) (h,t) dominates (h∗,t ∗), and
(ii) (h,t) is non-trivial.21
We show that (t1,t2) are strongly mutually pivotal. Fix buyer 2’s signal at (p2,c2) =
(p,c)∈[0,1]2. As V1((0,0),(p,c))≤t1(p2,c2)=p +c2 ≤V1((1,1),(p,c)), condition (i) of the
21In fact, if (pj,cj)6=(0,0) or (1,1) then each of the outcomes a0, a1, and a2 is implemented for a positive
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deﬁnition applies. Observe that (p1,c1) = (p,c) and (p2,c2) = (p,c) are mutually pivotal
signals that satisfy the restriction in condition (i):
V1((p,c),(p,c))=p +c2 =V2((p,c),(p,c)).
Theorem 3 implies that (h,t) is constrained efﬁcient.
Next observe that at (p1,c1) = (0.5,0.2), (p2,c2) = (0.4,0.8), V1 = 0.66 > 0.56 = V2.
However, as t1 = 1.04 and t2 = 0.54, buyer 2 is allocated the object at the information
state (p1,c1,p2,c2) = (0.5,0.2,0.4,0.8). Thus, the mechanism is not conditionally efﬁ-
cient. ◊
The next result shows that any mechanism that dominates the mechanism of The-
orem 1 must be conditionally inefﬁcient in that a buyer with a lower valuation is some-
times allocated the object. Thus, constrained efﬁciency and conditional efﬁciency are
conﬂicting objectives.
THEOREM 4. The allocation rule supported by the admissible prices deﬁned in (6) domi-
nates any other conditionally efﬁcient implementable allocation rule.
PROOF. Let t ∗ be deﬁned in (6), and let h∗ be a mechanism supported by t ∗. Let (h0,t 0)
be any other ex post incentive compatible mechanism. Suppose that t ∗
i (sj) > t 0
i(sj) for
some sj. Let λ∗ and λ0 be the indexes of buyer i indifference curves that are pivotal
at sj under t ∗
i and t 0
i, respectively. Clearly, λ∗ > λ0. Let sm
i ∈ S(λ∗,sj) be the point on
the λ∗-indifference curve at which Vj is maximized. That is, Vj(sj,sm
i ) = V m
ij (λ∗,sj).
Further, as S(λ∗,sj) is pivotal at sj under t ∗, the construction in Theorem 1 implies
that Vi(sm
i ,sj) = Vj(sj,sm
i ). Take any λ ∈ (λ0,λ∗) and si ∈ S(λ,sj) such that si < sm
i .
As Vi(sm
i ,sj) = Vj(sj,sm
i ), single crossing implies that Vi(si,sj) < Vj(sj,si). However, at
(si,sj) buyer i gets the object under (h0,t 0). Thus, (h0,t 0) is not conditionally efﬁcient.
Hence, for any other conditionally efﬁcient mechanism (h,t), we have t ∗
i (·) ≤ ti(·),
i = 1, 2. Therefore, whenever the object is allocated (to a buyer) under (h,t), it is also
allocated under (h∗,t ∗), with both mechanisms allocating to the buyer with the highest
valuation. As (h∗,t ∗)6=(h,t), at some information state (h∗,t ∗) allocates the object while
(h,t) does not. 
Consequently, among all conditionally efﬁcient mechanisms, the set of information
states at which the object is allocated is the largest in the mechanism of Theorem 1.
However, this mechanism is usually not constrained efﬁcient as it is unlikely to satisfy
the necessary condition of Theorem 2. To see this, we write the mutually pivotal con-
dition for this mechanism. Take any sj for which (10) holds. Let λ∗
i be the index of the
buyer i pivotal indifference curve at sj. That is, λ∗










Further, there exists si ∈Si(λ∗
i,sj) at which sj is buyer j pivotal. That is, letting λ∗
j be the
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This condition appears to be difﬁcult to satisfy, as we saw in Example 2. Whenever that
is the case, Theorem 2 implies that the mechanism of Theorem 1 is not constrained
efﬁcient.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Jehiel et al. (2006) question the existence of ex post equilibrium in models with multi-
dimensional signals and interdependent values. Our paper shows that ex post equi-
librium exists in such models with private goods. Existence is proved under the as-
sumptionthatbuyers’informationsatisﬁesageneralizationofthesingle-crossingprop-
erty. The mechanism shares the feature with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-
dimensionalinformationmodelsthatthepricepaidbythewinningbuyerisequaltothis
buyer’s value at the lowest possible signal (indifference curve) at which this buyer wins.
Thus, ex post equilibria in auction models with one-dimensional models are robust in
that non-trivial ex post equilibria exist even when buyers have multi-dimensional sig-
nals.
To reconcile our positive result with the negative result of Jehiel et al., observe that
no consumption externality is a natural assumption in many economic models. But in
the space of all preferences (with and without externalities), the absence of externalities
is non-generic. At a tiny perturbation away from the no externalities assumption, (8) is




equilibrium concept for models with private goods. Under a small departure from the
usual assumption of selﬁsh preferences in private goods models, many results in eco-
nomics would be only approximately true.
Three possible notions of efﬁciency are (i) ﬁrst-best efﬁciency without regard to in-
centive constraints, (ii) efﬁciency subject to incentive constraints, and (iii) conditional
efﬁciencysubjecttoincentiveconstraints. Inone-dimensionalsignalmodels,theincen-
tive constraints do not bind and all three types of efﬁciency are attainable in one mech-
anism. With multi-dimensional signals, incentive constraints preclude ﬁrst-best efﬁ-
ciency (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001) and we illustrate that, in the class of implementable
allocation rules, there is a tension between constrained efﬁciency and conditional efﬁ-
ciency. ThemechanismofTheorem1dominatesanyotherconditionallyefﬁcientmech-
anism but is not usually constrained efﬁcient. Conceivably, as the differences in how
the buyers aggregate the multiple dimensions of the signals decreases, the mechanism
of Theorem 1 approaches both constrained efﬁciency and ﬁrst-best efﬁciency.
APPENDIX
A. EXTENSION TO MANY BUYERS
Weoutlinetheminorchangesinnotation,assumptions,andanalysisrequiredtoextend
Theorem 1 to many buyers.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Ex post implementation 387
Each buyer’s valuation depends on the (possibly multi-dimensional) signals of all n
buyers. The information states are denoted s =(s1,s2,...,sn)=(si,s−i). Change sj to s−i
in Assumption 2, and require the assumption to hold for every Vi and Vj. Assumption 3
is required to hold for two distinct buyers, i.e., there exist two sets of information states,
Ai andAj,eachsetwithpositivemeasure,suchthatbuyeri’s[j’s]valueisstrictlygreater
than all other buyers’ values on the set Ai [Aj].
We write Vi(si,s−i), V m
ij (λ,s−i), gij(λ;s−i) instead of Vi(si,sj), V m
ij (λ,sj), gij(λ;sj),








max{λ∈[0,1]| gij(λ;s−i)=0} if gij(1;s−i)≥0≥ gij(0;s−i)
0 if gij(0;s−i)>0,
where gij(λ;s−i)≡Vi(λ1,s−i)−V m











B. MANY BUYERS AND MANY OBJECTS
There are n buyers indexed by i or j, and K objects indexed by k or `. Each buyer i
receives a d i-dimensional signal si ∈ [0,1]d i. Buyer i’s valuation for object k alone is
V k
i (si,s−i); his valuation for a subset L ⊆{1,2,...,K} is denoted V L
i (si,s−i). Each buyer’s




ij (λ,s−i), g k
ij(λ;s−i), λk
ij(s−i) instead of Si(λ,sj), V m
ij (λ,sj),
gij(λ;sj), λ∗
ij(s−i), etc. Note that only V k
i (si,s−i) = V k




i (λ1,s−i) when si ∈Sk
i (λ,s−i), `6=k.
The following generalizations of Assumptions 1 and 2 of Section 3 are sufﬁcient for
existence of admissible prices.
ASSUMPTION 1∗. For all i and k, V k
i is (a) non-decreasing and (b) continuous.









Personalized prices (which we show to be admissible for subadditive preferences
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Note that t k
i (s−i) ≥ 0. With Assumptions 1∗ and 2∗, the results of Section 3 generalize so
that for any s,
if V k
i (s)>t k
i (s−i) then V k
j (s) ≤ t k
j (s−j) for all j 6=i. (13)
Consider the following mechanism, which gives each buyer a surplus maximizing
bundle at personalized prices t k
i that satisfy (13) (for instance, the prices deﬁned in
(12)). Buyers report their signals. Personalized prices t k
i are computed for each buyer
and each object. Every buyer gets a minimal element in his demand set at the reported
signals at these personalized prices. Thus, if buyers report s = (s1,s2,...,sn) then buyer






















i (s−i) for some other L then L 6⊂ Li. Call
this mechanism a demand mechanism, because each buyer gets a (minimal) element of
his demand set.
No matter what preferences buyers have over subsets of objects, because at each
information state each buyer gets an element of his demand set, the demand mecha-
nism “satisﬁes” the ex post incentive compatibility constraints. However, in general this
mechanism may not be feasible as demand for an object may exceed its supply (of one
unit). We show that for subadditive preferences (deﬁned below), the demand mecha-
nism is feasible: each object is allocated to at most one buyer. Moreover, we exhibit
examples of subadditive preferences in which this mechanism is non-trivial.
Subadditive preferences The value of the union of two disjoint subsets is no greater




i (s) ∀L,L0 ⊂{1,2,...,K}, L ∩L0 =;. (14)
We mention two special cases of subadditive preferences. Clearly, additive preferences,
where the valuation of a subset is the sum of the valuations of objects in the subset,
satisfy (14) with equality. A second example is that of unit demand preferences, i.e., the
preferences of the assignment model. Each buyer has utility for at most one object. If a
buyer is given a subset of objects L, he selects an object with the highest valuation and






Note that the object that attains the maximum may vary with s. It is easily veriﬁed that
unit demand preferences also satisfy (14).
LEMMA 3. If Assumptions 1∗ and 2∗ are satisﬁed and buyers’ preferences are subadditive
then the demand mechanism is feasible and ex post incentive compatible.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Ex post implementation 389
PROOF. Let Li and Lj be the subsets allocated by the demand mechanism to buyers
i and j, j 6= i, at some information state s. We show that Li ∩ Lj = ;. If Li = ; there is
nothingtoprove. Therefore,supposethat Li 6=;. If Li ={k}forsomek,thenminimality
of Li implies that V k
i (s)−t k




























Therefore, if |Li| ≥ 1 then for any k ∈ Li we have V k
i (s) > t k
i (s−i); (13) implies that
V k
j (s) ≤ t k
j (s−j). This, together with subadditivity, implies that for any subset of objects






















Hence, L0 cannot be a minimal element of j’s demand set. Therefore, Lj ∩ Li = ;. The
demand mechanism is feasible for subadditive preferences.
Under truth-telling, each buyer gets an element of his demand set at the realized
information state. Therefore, the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible. 
It may be veriﬁed that the demand mechanism is non-trivial for additive prefer-
ences, provided that the analog of Assumption 3 of Section 3 holds. The following ex-
ample, which builds on Example 2, exhibits two examples of strictly subadditive prefer-
ences for which the demand mechanism is non-trivial.
EXAMPLE 3. There are three buyers, 1, 2, and 3, and two objects, a and b. Buyer i gets
signal (pai,pbi,ci), i = 1, 2, 3. Buyer i’s valuation for the object k as a function of buyer
signals is22
V k
i ≡pki +wkci max{cj,cj 0}, k =a,b,





j ,pkj 0 +wkc2
j 0}, k =a,b. (15)
Let ti = (t a
i ,t b
i ) be the personalized prices at which the two objects are available to
buyer i, i = 1, 2. Suppose that at some information state, buyer i’s value for object k
exceeds his personalized price. This implies that V k
i = pki +wkcicj > t k
i ≥ pkj +wkc2
j ,
22We assume that i, j, j 0 =1, 2, 3 are three distinct buyers, that is j 6= j 0 6=i 6= j.390 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
(pa1,pb1,c1) (0.9,0.1,0.5) (0.1,0.9,0.5) (0.9,0.9,0.5)
V a
1 1.1 0.3 1.1
V b
1 0.4 1.2 1.2
V ab
1 1.4 1.4 2.2
t a
1 0.56 0.56 0.56
t b
1 0.64 0.64 0.64
Buyer 1’s allocation a b ab
V a
2 0.6 0.6 0.6
V b
2 0.4 0.4 0.4
V ab
2 0.9 0.9 0.9
t a
2 1.15 0.35 1.15
t b
2 0.64 1.275 1.275
Buyer 2’s allocation ; a ;
V a
3 0.3 0.3 0.3
V b
3 0.7 0.7 0.7
V ab
3 0.9 0.9 0.9
t a
3 1.15 0.56 1.15
t b
3 0.475 1.275 1.275
Buyer 3’s allocation b ; ;
TABLE 1. Subadditive preferences.




j . Thus, the personalized prices deﬁned in (15) satisfy (13). By Lemma 3, the demand
mechanism at these personalized prices is ex post incentive compatible for any speciﬁ-
cation of V ab
i that satisﬁes the subadditive inequality (14).23
In the rest of this example we assume that wa = 1 and wb = 1.5. Thus, buyer i’s
reservation values for exactly one object are V a
i = pai +ci max{cj,cj 0} and V b
i = pbi +
1.5ci max{cj,cj 0}. We give two sets of preferences over the bundle ab for which this
mechanism is non-trivial.
Subadditive preferences Buyer i’s valuation for the bundle ab is
V ab
i ≡pai +pbi +2ci max{cj,cj 0}, i =1,2,3.
These preferences are subadditive. In the demand mechanism, buyer i is allocated
Li = ; if none of the subsets a, b or ab yields a strictly positive surplus at the personal-
ized prices at the realized (i.e., reported) information state. Otherwise he is allocated a
smallest Li ∈{a,b,ab} that maximizes his surplus.
To see that the mechanism is non-trivial, ﬁx buyer 2’s signals at (pa2,pb2,c2) =
(0.4,0.1,0.4) and buyer 3’s signals at (pa3,pb3,c3) = (0.1,0.4,0.4). Thus, t a
1 = max{0.4+
23These prices of (15) have not been deﬁned as in (12). The proof of Lemma 3 requires only that the




























Buyer 3’s allocation b ;
TABLE 2. Unit demand preferences.
(0.4)2,0.1+(0.4)2} = 0.56, and t b
1 = max{0.1+1.5×(0.4)2,0.4+1.5×(0.4)2} = 0.64. Fur-
ther, ﬁx c1 = 0.5. Hence, V a
2 = 0.6, V b
2 = 0.4, and V ab
2 = 0.9, and V a
3 = 0.3, V b
3 = 0.7, and
V ab
2 =0.9.
Allocations under the demand mechanism at three different values of buyer 1’s pri-
vate signals are shown in Table 1 (on the previous page). With (pa2,pb2,c2) ﬁxed at
(0.4,0.1,0.4), and (pa3,pb3,c3) at (0.1,0.4,0.4), we see that (i) buyer 1 gets object a, 2
gets nothing, and 3 gets b when (pa1,pb1,c1) = (0.9,0.1,0.5), (ii) buyer 1 gets object b,
2 gets a, and 3 gets nothing when (pa1,pb1,c1)=(0.1,0.9,0.5), and (iii) buyer 1 gets both
the objects when (pa1,pb1,c1) = (0.9,0.9,0.5). Moreover, at each of these three infor-
mation states, buyers’ demand sets are singletons. Hence, the allocation attained by
the demand mechanism is constant in a positive measure neighborhood around each
informationstate. Thus,thedemandmechanismisnon-trivial. Bysymmetry,themech-
anism has full range.




i }, i =1,2,3.
The demand mechanism allocates to buyer i the object that maximizes his surplus,
V k
i − t k
i , k = a,b, provided this surplus is positive; if V k
i − t k
i ≤ 0 for k = a,b then
buyer i gets nothing. To check that the mechanism is non-trivial, ﬁx buyer 2’s signals
at (pa2,pb2,c2) = (0.4,0.1,0.4), and buyer 3’s signals at (pa3,pb3,c3) = (0.1,0.4,0.4). Ta-
ble 2 shows that when (pa1,pb1,c1) = (0.9,0.1,0.5) buyer 1 gets object a and 3 gets b,
and when (pa1,pb1,c1) = (0.1,0.9,0.5), buyer 1 gets b and buyer 2 gets a. Moreover, as392 Sushil Bikhchandani Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
the demand set of each buyer is a singleton at each of the two information states, the
two allocations are implemented at a positive measure of information states. Hence,
the mechanism is non-trivial, and, by symmetry, has full range. ◊
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